Happily Ever After: Eliminating the 890 Usufruct to Protect the Blended Family by Dampf, Katherine H.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74 | Number 3
Spring 2014
Happily Ever After: Eliminating the 890 Usufruct to
Protect the Blended Family
Katherine H. Dampf
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation




Happily Ever After: Eliminating the 890 Usufruct to 
Protect the Blended Family 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Introduction ............................................................................. 900 
I. Succession Theories and the Stepfamily ................................ 903 
 A. The Theories Underlying Succession Law ...................... 904 
 1. The Natural Duty Theory ........................................... 904 
  a. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Children ..... 905 
  b. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s 
Surviving Spouse .................................................. 905 
 2. The Presumed Will Theory ........................................ 906 
 B. The Complications of the Stepfamily ............................... 906 
 1. The Blended Family ................................................... 907 
 2. The Complications of the Blended Family 
Exacerbated in Intestate Succession ........................... 909 
  a. Unnatural Ties ...................................................... 909 
  b. Uncomfortable Conversations and Passive 
Neglect .................................................................. 910 
  c. Conflicting Loyalties ............................................ 911 
II. Louisiana’s Deficient Treatment of the Stepfamily 
in Intestacy............................................................................... 912 
 A. The 890 Usufruct .............................................................. 912 
 1. The Historical Approach ............................................ 912 
 2. The 890 Usufruct Today ............................................. 914 
 B. The Inadequacies of the 890 Usufruct .............................. 916 
 1. The Inadequacies vis-à-vis the Stepfamily ................ 917 
  a. The Nature of the Usufruct: The Sharing of 
Attributes of Ownership ....................................... 917 
  b. The Prudent Administrator Standard ................... 917 
  c. The Power of the Usufructuary to Dispose 
of a Consumable Thing ........................................ 919 
  d. Security ................................................................. 920 
  e. Expenses ............................................................... 921 
 2. The Inadequacies of the 890 Usufruct vis-à-vis 
the Theories of Succession ......................................... 922 




  a. The Shortfalls of the 890 Usufruct Under 
the Natural Duty Theory ...................................... 922 
    i. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s 
Children ........................................................... 923 
   ii. The Natural Duty to the Surviving 
Spouse ............................................................. 923 
   b. The Shortfalls of the Presumed Will Theory ....... 924 
III. Other Approaches to the Cinderella Problem......................... 924 
 A. The Civilian Approach: What Has France Done? ........... 925 
 B. The United States .............................................................. 928 
 1. The Original Uniform Probate Code .......................... 928 
 2. The Revised Uniform Probate Code .......................... 929 
  3. The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in the 
United States ............................................................... 931 
IV. Solution: Adopting the Lump-Sum-Plus-a-Fraction 
Approach ................................................................................. 933 
 Conclusion ............................................................................... 935 
INTRODUCTION 
Cinderella lived happily ever after,1 but what became of her 
wicked stepmother, the Lady Drizella Trumaine?2 Imagine that this 
classic tale was set in Louisiana and that in the years following 
Cinderella’s storybook wedding, Cinderella’s father and Drizella 
spent the remainder of their lives together. Though they were happy, 
they were not particularly wealthy, and Cinderella’s father never 
drafted a will. When Cinderella’s father died, Louisiana law granted 
Drizella an interest in his share of the marital property in the form of 
a usufruct.3 However, although Drizella was relieved to learn that 
she would be permitted to use and enjoy her husband’s property in 
the years following his death, she was dismayed when she learned 
that Louisiana law also granted Cinderella an interest in the same 
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 1. CHARLES PERRAULT, PERRAULT’S FAIRY TALES 56 (A. E. Johnson trans., 
2004). 
 2. CINDERELLA (Walt Disney Animation Studios 1950). 
 3. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2014) (providing that upon a spouse’s death, 
the surviving spouse receives a usufruct over the deceased spouse’s one-half 
interest in community property). 




property, effectively forcing Drizella to share her former husband’s 
property with her ungrateful stepdaughter.4 
One might imagine that this sharing of interests would not be the 
most optimal arrangement, considering that the two did not have the 
most natural and affectionate relationship.5 Drizella’s interest only 
allows her the right to use the property and collect its fruits.6 
Consequently, she may encounter financial difficulties if the 
property does not generate income in the form of civil fruits—like 
rents or dividends—because she is precluded from selling the 
property to create liquid income. Given the tumultuous relationship 
between Cinderella and her wicked stepmother, Cinderella would 
feel no duty to come to Drizella’s aid. Indeed, Cinderella’s contempt 
for Drizella might only be exacerbated by a legal scheme that 
effectively deprives her of any right to her father’s estate while her 
stepmother is still living and unmarried.7 Louisiana’s default 
inheritance regime, designed both to approximate the will of the 
decedent and provide for those left behind, serves no one in this 
blended family. 
A decedent who dies intestate—without a will—necessarily 
does not express desires regarding the property left behind. Instead, 
intestacy law imposes a “statutory will” on the decedent.8 Many 
states have had to rethink traditional intestacy rules to address the 
new social phenomenon of intestate succession involving a 
stepparent and a decedent’s children,9 referred to in this Comment 
                                                                                                             
 4. See A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 7:5, in 3 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 438 (5th ed. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he naked ownership 
of the share of the deceased spouse devolves to his descendants by intestacy and 
the surviving spouse obtains a legal usufruct over that share”). 
 5. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 6. As a usufructuary, Drizella would only be entitled to use and enjoy the 
property as well as receive any civil or natural fruits from the property. 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 4, § 2:2, at 111. The right to dispose or otherwise 
alienate the property resides with the naked owner alone—in this case, Cinderella. 
See id. § 5:3, at 341. For more on the governing features of the usufruct, see infra 
Part II.A.2. 
 7. See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the legal scheme that arises by 
operation of law terminates upon the earlier of death or remarriage of the surviving 
spouse). 
 8. Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Note, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws 
Through Judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from Common Law 
Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 449 (2003). See also Susan N. 
Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 1 (2000) 
(describing a “statutory will” as one in which “the government, rather than the 
individual, determines the dispositive terms”). 
 9. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Averill, Jr. & Ellen B. Brantley, A Comparison of 
Arkansas’s Current Law Concerning Succession, Wills, and Other Donative 
Transfers with Article II of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE 




as the “Cinderella Problem.”10 Louisiana Civil Code provisions 
governing intestacy were made with “the family of the Civil 
Code”11 in mind: a traditional, nuclear family that has become 
increasingly rare in modern society.12 An artifact from a departed 
era during which the traditional, nuclear family was bound by 
lifelong affection, Louisiana’s “statutory will” is out of sync with 
the modern family. Today, more than one-third of all Americans are 
members of stepfamilies,13 18% of American adults have a living 
stepparent,14 and most Americans die without wills.15 With a 
divorce and remarriage rate higher than the national average,16 
                                                                                                             
 
ROCK L. REV. 631, 635 (1995); Hargis, supra note 8, at 447–48; Andrew L. 
Noble, Note, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in Pennsylvania: A Proposal 
for Reform, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 835 (2003). 
 10. The author is grateful to Professor Andrea B. Carroll for suggesting this 
appellation. 
 11. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Changing Concept of Family and Its 
Effect on Louisiana Succession Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2003) (quoting 
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 15 (1981)). 
 12. Id. at 1164. 
 13. Noble, supra note 9, at 835. 
 14. PEW RESEARCH CTR., A PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES (2011) [hereinafter A 
PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES], available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011 
/01/13/a-portrait-of-stepfamilies [http://perma.cc/8MAG-NUBK] (archived Mar. 4, 
2014). 
 15. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy 
Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 172 
(2006). Nearly 2.5 million Americans die each year, and many die without a will, 
subjecting themselves to the laws of intestacy. Deborah L. Jacobs, The Real 
Estate-Planning Crisis Isn’t About Taxes, FORBES (June 27, 2012, 6:00 PM), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0716/investing-esate-tax-con 
gress-rites-of-passage.html [http://perma.cc/UZH6-RL4E] (archived Mar. 4, 2014) 
(explaining that a 2011 Associated Press survey showed 64% of baby boomers did 
not have a will). See also Hargis, supra note 8, at 449–50 (demonstrating the vast 
effects of intestacy law, given that nearly half of the U.S. population dies without a 
will); Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 
U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 649 (2002) (explaining that in spite of the many options 
available regarding the distribution of their property, many people die intestate); 
Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club—Examining the 
Financial [In]security of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
309, 350 (1999) (showing the importance of intestacy rules, given that the 
majority of people die intestate); John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Curnutte, 
Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to 
Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61, 72 (1990) (citing empirical studies that 
show more people die intestate than testate). 
 16. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A 50 STATE TOUR 
(2009) [hereinafter MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A 50 STATE TOUR], available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/15/marriages-and-divorce-a-50-state-
tour [http://perma.cc/5454-KGBZ] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). 




Louisiana must do more to balance the competing interests of a 
blended family in intestacy. 
Because Louisiana law fails to adequately address the 
combination of the stepfamily and intestacy, Louisiana law allows 
for the dynamic between Cinderella and Drizella to exist to their 
mutual detriment. Louisiana’s failure to address the needs of the 
stepfamily in intestacy is made even more apparent by the fact that 
other jurisdictions—both civil and common law—addressed 
stepfamily inheritance long ago.17 Louisiana should follow in the 
footsteps of its sister states and of France, its civilian predecessor, to 
better address the Cinderella Problem, recalibrating intestacy laws 
with today’s blended family in mind and preventing injustices like 
those suffered by Cinderella and Drizella from befalling others.  
Accordingly, this Comment considers the failure of Louisiana’s 
current succession law in the context of the stepfamily. Part I of this 
Comment discusses the theories underlying succession law, 
highlighting the role of these theories in intestacy and arguing that 
they require a careful balancing of the interests of the children and 
the surviving spouse of the decedent. Part I also details the societal 
evolution of the family from nuclear to blended, illustrating how the 
implementation of the theories of succession has become even more 
problematic. Next, Part II overviews the approach taken by 
Louisiana to the stepfamily in intestacy, both in the past and in the 
present, and demonstrates that Louisiana’s current approach is 
inadequate in several critical respects. Part III then evaluates the 
merits of approaches to the Cinderella Problem taken by France and 
other jurisdictions. Finally, in order to solve the predicament facing 
Cinderella and Drizella, Part IV proposes that a lump-sum-plus-a-
fraction, rather than a usufruct, be allotted to Drizella. A revision of 
Civil Code article 890 in the context of the stepfamily is long 
overdue; Louisiana needs to do more for Cinderella and Drizella. 
I. SUCCESSION THEORIES AND THE STEPFAMILY 
The solution to the current Louisiana regime requires a sensitive 
balancing of both Cinderella and Drizella’s interests. An 
understanding of the competing interests at play requires a working 
knowledge of the theories underlying succession law generally. The 
description of the prevalent succession theories is followed by a 
Section discussing the blended family, providing a synopsis of the 
blended family in America today, and illustrating the complex 
interests involved when the succession theories and the stepfamily 
are simultaneously considered. 
                                                                                                             
 17. See infra Part III. 




A. The Theories Underlying Succession Law 
Succession law governs the distribution of a decedent’s property 
upon death.18 A succession is either testate, occurring when a 
decedent dies with a valid will, or intestate, occurring when a 
decedent dies without a will.19 Many theories underlie intestacy 
provisions;20 however, two theories are more commonly applied: the 
natural duty theory and the presumed will theory.21 
1. The Natural Duty Theory 
The natural duty theory relies upon societal views about what a 
decedent “ought” to do.22 This approach to intestacy does not 
necessarily reflect how the decedent would want property 
distributed upon death but rather how property should be distributed 
upon death in order to further the goals of society.23 Academics 
argue that a decedent’s natural duty to dependent family members is 
germane to intestacy, given that an underlying concern in any 
succession scheme is “justice and fairness” for the decedent’s 
successors.24 
                                                                                                             
 18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 871 (2014). 
 19. DENNIS R. HOWER & PETER KAHN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATE 
ADMINISTRATION 6 (7th ed. 2012). 
 20. Scalise, supra note 15, at 176 n.19. Intestacy statutes vary widely from 
state to state. Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public 
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in 
the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 322 (1978). 
 21. See Scalise, supra note 15, at 173. These two theories were considered as 
“primary considerations” at the turn of the 20th century and even as far back as 
Roman times. See id. at 174. Professor Scalise explains that these are not the only 
theories underlying succession law. Id. at 176 n.19. Though the presumed will and 
natural duty theories are the most influential in the United States, he explains, 
others do exist. Id. For instance, Roman succession law was premised on the goal 
of the continuance of families into the next generation after the head of the family 
died. Id. Another goal of American succession law is the recognition and support 
furthering the family unit. This is seen throughout intestacy statutes in various 
states. In every intestate succession scheme, the decedent’s family is the recipient 
of the decedent’s property. Hargis, supra note 8, at 452. 
 22. Scalise, supra note 15, at 173–75. 
 23. See KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 2:1, 
in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 16 (2d ed. 2009). 
 24. Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy 
Provisions for Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 947 
(1995). 




a. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Children 
Historically, the natural duty theory supported the devolution of 
a decedent’s property to relatives who needed it most—minor 
children.25 Academics argued that children were entitled to their 
intestate inheritance based on their parents’ natural duty to “preserve 
what they had begotten.”26 Without their parents’ assistance, most 
minor children would be inadequately supported, thus relying on the 
State for support.27 
b. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Surviving Spouse 
However, minor children may not be the only relatives in need 
of financial assistance upon the death of the decedent. The surviving 
spouse may also require support.28 If beyond the age to rejoin the 
workforce, the surviving spouse could be economically destitute.29 
Government assistance through social security benefits can make a 
difference, but alone it is not enough, as these payments are barely 
above the poverty level.30 Together, these facts suggest that the 
surviving spouse could be in need of assistance. Therefore, in 
compliance with the natural duty theory, default intestacy provisions 
should consider the potentially destabilized position of the surviving 
spouse. 
Thus, under the natural duty theory, a duty of support is 
warranted to both the surviving spouse and the decedent’s children 
upon the decedent’s death. Neither should inherit to the complete 
detriment of the other; instead, striking a balance between the 
interests of the surviving spouse and the decedent’s children should 
be the ultimate goal. 
                                                                                                             
 25. 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 413 (Christopher Berry 
Gray ed., 1999). 
 26. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 207 (Peter 
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)). 
 27. See Steve Hargreaves, Deadbeat Parents Cost Taxpayers $53 Billion, 
CNNMONEY (Nov. 5, 2012, 5:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/05/news 
/economy/unpaid-child-support/index.html [http://perma.cc/DV74-KPA3] (archived 
Mar. 4, 2014) (explaining that in 2009, the federal government paid out $53 billion 
for public assistance because parents neglected to financially support their children). 
 28. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 
MO. L. REV. 21, 33 (1994). 
 29. Only 13% of surviving spouses ages 65 and older report income from 
earnings. Id. at 31. For more on the economic position of the surviving spouse, see 
id. at 38–40 (detailing the predicament a surviving spouse could be in when facing 
the real-world, modern costs of growing old). 
 30. Id. at 32. 




2. The Presumed Will Theory 
The role of intestacy with respect to a decedent’s children and 
surviving spouse becomes more complex when one considers the 
presumed will theory of intestate succession. Unlike the natural duty 
theory, the presumed will theory focuses on the supposed desires of 
the decedent in the distribution of the estate.31 According to this 
theory, state legislatures draft statutes based on how the average 
person would dispose of property upon death.32 Given the difficulty 
in determining a person’s presumed desires without a will, 
policymakers look to the distribution patterns of testate decedents 
for insight.33 Studies have shown that most people of modest means, 
even people with children from a prior marriage, leave their entire 
estates to their surviving spouses.34  
When the presumed will and natural duty theories are viewed in 
tandem, as they should be in the formulation of any intestacy 
regime, it is apparent that while the needs of both the spouse and the 
children should be taken into account, the State ought to ensure that 
a significant portion of the decedent’s property devolves to the 
surviving spouse in the absence of a will. 
B. The Complications of the Stepfamily 
A change in the construct of the family over the last several 
decades has rendered the balancing of a decedent’s natural duty and 
presumed will in intestate succession even more problematic. Given 
                                                                                                             
 31. Scalise, supra note 15, at 173. Around since the 17th century, the 
presumed will theory is not a modern approach to the fashioning of intestacy 
provisions. Id. at 174. In the 19th century, French Civil Code redactors stated, 
“The legislation on successions is the presumed testament of every person who 
dies without having validly expressed a different will.” Id. Conforming with this 
theory, the redactors created legislation that “dictate[d] as the deceased himself 
would have dictated at the last instant of his life, if he had been able and willing to 
express himself.” Id. 
 32. Daniel H. O’Connell & Richard W. Effland, Intestate Succession and 
Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate 
Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 209 (1972). Given that it is impossible to create a 
statute that comports with every decedent’s presumed will in every situation, it is 
impossible to carry out the presumed will of the decedent in each specific instance. 
Gary, supra note 14, at 646. 
 33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 2.2 (1999) (listing empirical studies); see also MARY ANN 
GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 282 (1977) (discussing the desires of the average 
American spouse in determining how to distribute his or her property). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 2.2 (1999); see also GLENDON, supra note 33, at 282. 




that the United States has developed one of the highest divorce and 
remarriage rates in the Western world,35 gone are the days of the 
“Cleaver” family norm.36 With more than four in ten Americans 
reporting they have at least one step-relative,37 the American family 
is not what it used to be.38 
1. The Blended Family  
Today, divorce and remarriage are common experiences in the 
lives of Americans,39 causing a dramatic change in the structure of 
the American family.40 The traditional nuclear family consisting of 
                                                                                                             
 35. Belinda Luscombe, Who Needs Marriage? A Changing Institution, TIME 
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2032116-
1,00.html [http://perma.cc/78JR-JEZU] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). See also Pat 
Wingert, Americans Have Highest Divorce, Remarriage Rate, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 
14, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/14/ameri 
cans-marry-too-much.html [http://perma.cc/8M6S-JAJZ] (archived Mar. 4, 2014) 
(showing how the American divorce rate is higher than other countries’ divorce 
rates). 
 36. “Leave it To Beaver” was a mid-century American television show that 
depicted the “‘typical’ American family consisting of a mother, father and two 
kids” and was “a favorite stereotype of the nuclear family.” Gary, supra note 8, at 
4 n.14 (explaining that the “Cleaver family” is no longer the norm in America). 
 37. A PORTRAIT OF STEPFAMILIES, supra note 14. See also Engel, supra note 
15, at 343 (explaining that children today are more likely to live with stepparents 
and half-siblings than biological parents and siblings); Noble, supra note 9, at 835 
(citing data showing that one-third of all Americans are members of stepfamilies). 
 38. Noble, supra note 9, at 835. See also Marissa J. Holob, Note, Respecting 
Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the 
Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 1493 (2000) (explaining 
that the structure of American families has changed dramatically in recent decades); 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 16 
(2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends 
-2010-families.pdf [http://perma.cc/M7EG-J332] (archived Mar. 4, 2014) 
(demonstrating that although America had a higher marriage rate than the European 
Union, America’s divorce rate was higher than that of the European Union). 
 39. Engel, supra note 15, at 319. In 1997, 50% of all marriages were likely to 
end in divorce. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1164. In nearly one-half of all marriages 
today, at least one of the spouses has been married once before. Id. For a detailed 
discussion of changes in family throughout the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries, see 
id. See also 5 EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 7 (Kenneth G. C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007) (explaining that this “redefinition” of the 
family has been taking place as a result of social developments). 
 40. This change in the family construct can be attributed to easier divorce 
laws and the now commonplace notion of “serial polygamy.” Lorio, supra note 
11, at 1177−78. Professor Lorio coined the term “serial polygamy” from Harry D. 
Krause and David D. Meyer’s What Family for the 21st Century?. See Harry D. 
Krause & David D. Meyer, What Family for the 21st Century?, 50 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 101, 103 (2002) (“[W]ithout calling it by that name, modern divorce law and 




the breadwinning husband, the stay-at-home wife, and their two 
children exists today but in much lower numbers than in the past.41 
Moreover, most divorced people remarry, creating blended 
stepfamilies.42 With the modern divorce rate nearly twice the rate of 
that of the 1950s,43 it is estimated that there are more stepfamilies 
than nuclear families in the United States today.44 U.S. Census 
Bureau data shows that in 2004, 12% of women and 13% of men 
had married twice.45 Three percent of both men and women had 
been married three or more times.46 
Additionally, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
most spouses that remarry already have children.47 Remarriages are 
                                                                                                             
 
practice have resulted in a sort of legitimization of polygamy by way of 
legalizing multiple, successive marriages or relationships of persons who have 
continuing legal, financial and social ties to prior partners and children.”). 
Additionally, with the advent of “no-fault divorce,” the decision to divorce 
became unilateral, and mutual consent to divorce was no longer necessary. 
David Milstead, As Two-Income Family Model Matures, Divorce Rate Falls, 
CNBC (May 7, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46797203/As_Two 
_Income_Family_Model_Matures_Divorce_Rate_Falls [http://perma.cc/EZK6-
6H2G] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). Also, economic changes facilitated the ease of 
divorce. Id. With wives transitioning from stay-at-home mothers to career 
women in the 1960s and 1970s, women’s new income made it possible for them 
to separate from their husbands more easily. Id. 
 41. Holob, supra note 38, at 1493. See also E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive 
Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1063, 1094 (1999) (explaining “traditional families” have become 
increasingly less typical in recent years). 
 42. Lorio, supra note 11, at 1164. 
 43. KRISTEN CELLELO, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES: MAKING MARRIAGE WORK 4 (2009). 
 44. Janice Van Dyck, In Praise of Stepfamilies, BLOG (Aug. 11, 2011, 1:19 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-van-dyck/in-praise-of-stepfamilies_b 
_920688\.html [http://perma.cc/5VB3-V2HB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). 
 45. Press Release, The U.S. Census Bureau, Most People Make Only One 
Trip Down the Aisle, But First Marriages Shorter (Sept. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/most-people-make-only-one-trip-do 
wn-the-aisle-but-first-marriages-shorter-census-bureau-reports-58151357.html 
[http://perma.cc/5Z3D-HAFB] (archived Mar. 4, 2014). 
 46. Id. The remarriage rate after divorce tends to be higher for men than for 
women, with more than half of the men who have ever been divorced currently 
remarried. Id. This number is based on adults ages 25 and older. Id. 
 47. Rose M. Kreider, United States Census Bureau, Presentation at the 
American Sociological Association annual meeting: Remarriage in the United States 
(Aug. 10–14, 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/marriage 
/data/sipp/us-remarriage-poster.pdf [http://perma.cc/E2X4-6T26] (archived Mar. 4, 
2014). Additionally, researchers predict that more than half of all women in the 
United States will become stepmothers upon remarriage. Wednesday Martin, Let’s 
Stop Expecting Sandra Bullock to Be a Stepmartyr, HUFFINGTON POST ENT. (Mar. 
24, 2010, 1:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wednesday-martin/lets-stop-




often “fragile” and “unstable,”48 characteristics that have been 
shown to negatively affect the children involved.49 With a divorce 
and remarriage rate higher than the national average, Louisiana 
should be particularly attentive to the increased complications of the 
stepfamily in intestacy.50 
2. The Complications of the Blended Family Exacerbated in 
Intestate Succession 
Certain factors exacerbate the complications experienced by 
stepfamilies in intestate successions. Such factors include unnatural 
ties, passive neglect, and conflicting loyalties. An analysis of these 
factors shows that Louisiana’s current law, article 890, is wholly 
inadequate when dealing with the stepfamily in intestacy. 
a. Unnatural Ties 
Stepparents face a myriad of complexities in their relationships 
with their new family members, not the least of which is learning 
how to love another person’s child.51 Unlike the biological 
relationship between a parent and child, the relationship between a 
stepparent and stepchild is fixed through remarriage.52 Upon 
remarriage, spouses step into an awkward “family dance,” requiring 
each new spouse to determine the dynamic of his or her relationship 
with his or her spouse, the spouse’s children, and often the 
children’s other biological parent.53 Additionally, the stepparent 
could face the primitive emotion of suspicion of the child.54 Not 
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Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What’s Become of Disinherison, and the 
Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REV. 637, 661−62 
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surprisingly, only 20% of stepchildren report to have a good 
relationship with their stepparents.55 
According to experts, the problems plaguing Cinderella and 
Drizella may not be limited to the world of fairy tales but rather are 
rooted in fact. In particular, social scientists “agree that families with 
a full-time stepmother do worse than families with a stepfather.”56 
This may be a result of the stepmother inherently being more 
difficult or perhaps because tensions between the stepmother and the 
biological mother cause more complications.57 Presumably, the 
unnatural ties between step-relatives are likely to persist after the 
decedent’s passing.58 
b. Uncomfortable Conversations and Passive Neglect 
In addition to unnatural ties, stepfamilies face other 
complications.59 According to one academic, “Stepfamilies face 
complex emotional issues as they sort out and create family 
relationships.”60 Given these complex and new interaction patterns, 
stepfamilies avoid necessary discussions. Conversations about 
money are a source of discourse in first marriages,61 but given the 
layer of complex emotional issues that is added to the blended 
family, these conversations only become more complicated in the 
stepfamily context.62 For similar reasons, stepfamilies avoid 
discussion of inheritance because “stating inheritance rights in a 
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legal document may raise issues that stepparents and their spouses 
would rather avoid.”63 Scholars have coined this phenomenon as 
“passive neglect.”64 
Evading this discussion, remarried spouses often fail to make a 
will.65 Avoiding uncomfortable inheritance discussions, however, 
can lead to a bombshell for the intestate successor’s blended family 
because intestacy statutes are patterned after the traditional family.66 
c. Conflicting Loyalties 
When the decedent is the spouse with children from a prior 
marriage, the surviving spouse may face “conflicting loyalties.”67 
When spouses remarry at a later age, their adult children likely feel 
entitled to their share of inheritance from their natural parent.68 
These conflicting loyalties can cause “steam to rise” when a 
decedent dies intestate after multiple spouses, children, and 
stepchildren are thrown into the mix.69 
Further, these issues are not rare.70 Pew Research data confirms 
the complications resulting from the unnatural ties between 
stepparents and stepchildren.71 According to a recent study, only 
62% of stepparents say they would feel obligated to their grown 
stepchildren, compared with 78% of people who would feel 
obligated to their grown natural children.72 This variance between 
the views of stepparents and natural parents regarding their duty to 
children is intensified in intestacy. 
Thus, the complications of the blended family impact intestacy 
policy in several fundamental ways. The increased prevalence of 
stepfamilies requires a legislative response to the complications that 
result. Because most people who are remarried fail to make a will,73 
state legislatures must enact intestacy legislation that accounts for 
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the blended family’s unique dynamic. Additionally, given the 
unnatural ties and conflicting loyalties that plague the stepfamily 
relationship, state legislatures ought to create laws that minimize the 
ways in which the intestacy regime might exacerbate potential 
conflicts within the stepfamily. 
II. LOUISIANA’S DEFICIENT TREATMENT OF THE STEPFAMILY IN 
INTESTACY 
Viewed in tandem, the natural duty and presumed will theories 
suggest that both the children and the surviving spouse should be 
provided for upon a decedent’s death, with an emphasis on the 
preservation of the surviving spouse. The complications posed by 
the stepfamily indicate that an ideal intestacy regime would 
apportion the property in such a way that litigation and family 
discord are minimized, both in terms of the amount of property that 
each party receives and the extent to which the division of property 
requires the parties to interact with one another. In light of these 
considerations, however, Louisiana’s treatment of the stepfamily in 
intestacy fails in several critical respects. 
A. The 890 Usufruct 
The modern rights of the surviving spouse in intestacy are the 
byproduct of an evolution of the surviving spouse’s historical 
position in Louisiana intestacy law.74 A review of the evolution of 
the mechanisms at play in intestacy law illustrates the shortfalls of 
the current approach and the need for further legislative action for 
the blended family in intestacy. 
1. The Historical Approach 
The intestate rights of a surviving spouse were historically much 
more limited than they are today.75 Until 1870, upon a decedent’s 
intestate death, the community property acquired during a marriage 
was given to the decedent’s legal heirs, not the surviving spouse.76 
With the creation of article 915 of the Civil Code of 1870, the 
surviving spouse received a usufruct over the decedent’s half of the 
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community property for life.77 Still today, a surviving spouse is 
granted a spousal usufruct over the decedent’s share of community 
property.78 The usufruct enables the surviving spouse to take a 
limited interest in the decedent’s share, rather than outright 
ownership.79 The creation of the spousal usufruct in intestacy thus 
represents the beginning of an improvement of the surviving 
spouse’s position.80 
The introduction of the spousal usufruct was seen primarily as a 
balance between the needs and interests of the surviving spouse and 
those of the decedent’s children, who were all classified as forced 
heirs at the time.81 This balance of interests was initially 
accomplished because the provision was drafted with a certain type 
of family in mind—one where marriages were for life and children 
were born of that marriage.82 The balance was also achieved 
because the spousal usufruct affected only the decedent’s share of 
community property and therefore did not at all affect the decedent’s 
children’s “unfettered use and disposal” of their deceased parent’s 
separate property.83 Additionally, the termination of the usufruct 
upon the remarriage of the surviving spouse protected the 
decedent’s children from the influence of the surviving spouse’s 
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new partner.84 Overall, the decedent’s children and the surviving 
spouse of the “family of the Civil Code” were well provided for. 
Many Louisianans were content with the intestacy scheme in place 
and chose not to make a will, opting instead for the default 
provisions to control.85 
Importantly, the Cinderella Problem was entirely avoided when 
the spousal usufruct was first introduced. The eligible property to be 
held in usufruct was limited to the property that was inherited by a 
child of the marriage between the decedent and the surviving 
spouse.86 A stepparent was therefore never afforded a right of 
usufruct over a stepchild’s inheritance.87 This did not mean, 
however, that the law effectively met the needs of the spouse and 
children in a blended family—although the children retained their 
right to inherit, the surviving spouse was effectively denied rights to 
the estate as a result of the surviving spouse’s relationship to them. 
In 1981, to rectify the perceived injustice that befell a surviving 
spouse who was also a stepparent of the decedent’s children, the 
Louisiana Legislature reformed the law to extend the spousal 
usufruct to all spouses, regardless of the existence of a blended 
family.88 Although the law as revised significantly advanced the 
rights of the surviving spouse, the Cinderella Problem emerged, and 
the potential for new conflicts was born.89 The myopic legislation 
merely extended rights—formulated for the traditional nuclear 
family—to stepparents and did nothing to address the complications 
of the stepfamily. Thirty years after taking an initial step in the right 
direction, Louisiana needs to modernize the law applicable to the 
stepfamily in intestacy. 
2. The 890 Usufruct Today 
Today, the spousal usufruct is found in Civil Code article 890.90 
The characterization of the spouse’s right as one in usufruct rather 
than full ownership imposes a limitation on the power of the spouse 
with respect to the property and brings with it significant 
complications. An overview of the features governing the usufruct is 
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required to illustrate the usufruct’s grave inadequacies when 
implemented in the context of intestacy and the blended family. 
First, a usufruct is a real right of limited duration.91 The person 
who holds the usufruct, the “usufructuary,” receives the right to use 
and enjoy the property.92 The person who holds the right of 
disposition is known as the “naked owner.”93 The usufructuary is 
responsible for what are considered “ordinary repairs,” while the 
naked owner is responsible for “extraordinary repairs.”94 
The timing of the termination of the right varies with the type of 
usufruct at issue, and the law provides that the 890 usufruct 
terminates upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse.95 
At termination of the 890 usufruct, the naked owners—the 
decedent’s children—receive the usufructuary’s rights of use and 
enjoyment, in addition to their own rights of abusus, and thus enjoy 
full ownership.96 Importantly, the surviving spouse receives a 
limited right that cannot be passed on to his or her own successors.97 
The precise obligations of the usufructuary depend upon whether 
the property subject to the usufruct is classified as consumable or 
nonconsumable.98 With respect to nonconsumables—things that 
“may be enjoyed without alteration of [their] substance,”99—such as 
land, houses, shares of stock, furniture, and vehicles,100 the 
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usufructuary is limited to the mere use and enjoyment of the 
property—the usufructuary has no right to dispose of it.101 
Additionally, the usufructuary is bound to care for things subject to 
the usufruct as a “prudent administrator.”102 
The usufructuary has different rights with respect to consumable 
things.103 The Code defines “consumable things” as things that 
cannot be used without being expended or consumed, such as 
money.104 When a usufructuary holds a usufruct over a consumable 
thing, the usufructuary becomes the owner of it.105 With this 
ownership, the usufructuary has the right to dispose of the thing.106 
The ownership requirement is necessary in this instance because a 
consumable thing is, by its nature, disposed of through use.107 Upon 
the termination of a usufruct of a consumable thing, the usufructuary 
is obligated to either pay the naked owner the value the thing had at 
the commencement of the usufruct or deliver to the naked owner 
things of the same quantity or quality.108 
B. The Inadequacies of the 890 Usufruct 
When the Legislature extended the spousal usufruct to the 
blended family in intestacy, more problems were created than were 
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solved. Features of the 890 usufruct do little to cater to the 
potential acrimonious relationships within the blended family and 
additionally fail to promote either of the predominant succession 
theories. 
1. The Inadequacies vis-à-vis the Stepfamily 
What follows is a delineation of the features of the usufruct that 
render it a poor mechanism to be implemented in the context of 
intestacy and the blended family. These include the nature of the 
usufruct itself, the prudent administrator standard, the power of the 
usufructuary to dispose of consumable things, the concept of 
security, and the concept of expenses. 
a. The Nature of the Usufruct: The Sharing of Attributes of 
Ownership 
As explained above, a usufruct is an example of a 
dismemberment of full ownership whereby the usufructuary 
receives the rights of use and enjoyment of the thing held in usufruct 
and the naked owner retains the right to dispose of the thing.109 
These separate rights of the usufructuary and naked owner are 
shared over the same property contemporaneously.110 Thus, under 
article 890, the surviving spouse receives the usufruct over the 
decedent’s one-half share of community property, while the 
decedent’s children receive naked ownership over the same share.111 
Given the potential acrimony within blended families, forcing the 
surviving spouse and the decedent’s children to concurrently 
exercise their interests in the same property allows for the 
exacerbation of any rancorous dynamics within the stepfamily that 
predate the decedent’s death. Thus, the inherent sharing of interests 
that underlies the nature of the usufruct may become the source for 
more discord in a blended family. 
b. The Prudent Administrator Standard 
Additionally, the standard governing the usufructuary’s actions 
vis-à-vis the property—the prudent administrator standard112—is 
potentially another source of enmity. While the term “prudent 
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administrator” is interpreted by various examples in the Civil Code, 
the standard still remains fairly imprecise and does not provide 
much guidance for what a usufructuary can and cannot do.113 This 
vague standard has been clarified through jurisprudential examples, 
defining the prudent administrator standard as requiring “the 
diligence that an attentive and careful man commonly exercises in 
the management of his own affairs”; however, even this definition is 
disturbing because it provides no guidelines for the usufructuary and 
its violation is determined by the courts as a question of fact.114 In 
the absence of precise statutory contours, the interpretation of the 
standard is susceptible to inconsistent and subjective judicial 
interpretation. 
This loose standard has unique and unnecessary repercussions 
for the stepfamily and intestacy. For example, if Drizella holds a 
usufruct over a nonconsumable, she can do anything to the 
detriment of Cinderella, so long as she abides by this loose standard. 
Contrarily, Drizella might take certain actions believing that she is 
acting within the confines of the prudent administrator standard, just 
to find out in later litigation that she was not. Given the difficulty in 
determining what Drizella is permitted to do within the prudent 
administrator standard, Drizella could be chilled in her use of the 
property or could incur significant legal expenses in hiring an 
attorney to counsel her with respect to her use of the assets. The 
unclear definition lends itself to disagreement, which if escalated to 
litigation, would result in significant costs to both the surviving 
spouse and the children. Default intestacy provisions should not 
provide a forum for additional disagreement between Drizella and 
Cinderella. 
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c. The Power of the Usufructuary to Dispose of a Consumable 
Thing 
When the 890 usufruct is applied to a consumable thing,115 the 
surviving spouse receives ownership over the consumable thing, and 
upon termination, the surviving spouse has to either pay the value 
that the thing had at the commencement of the usufruct to the 
decedent’s children or deliver to them things of the same quantity or 
quality.116 
This setup could prove troublesome in the context of the 
stepfamily and intestacy where a stepmother has no regard for the 
decedent’s children’s eventual rights as naked owners. For example, 
assume Drizella receives a usufruct over the decedent’s share of 
cash or bank accounts formerly owned by the spouses as community 
property, essentially assuming “ownership” over the funds. She can 
do what she wants with the cash or bank accounts during the 
usufruct; however, at the termination of the usufruct, she is required 
to pay Cinderella, the naked owner, the value that the cash had at the 
usufruct’s commencement.117 If the usufruct terminates by 
Drizella’s remarriage, then she will be required to make an 
accounting and repay Cinderella within the parameters set by the 
Code.118 If, however, the usufruct terminates as a result of Drizella’s 
death, the amount owed to Cinderella becomes an estate debt 
enforceable against Drizella’s universal successors.119 Because the 
usufruct of consumables affords the surviving spouse considerably 
more freedom in disposing of the assets subject to the usufruct, the 
potential for abuse is great. Drizella could dispose of valuable 
consumable assets—including, for example, cash, jewelry, or other 
personal items—and fail to reserve sufficient assets to account for 
the value of the consumables at the usufruct’s termination. If all or a 
significant portion of the decedent’s estate is made up of 
consumable property, then it is quite possible for Drizella to use the 
entirety of the estate for her own support and enjoyment and die 
insolvent, thereby leaving Cinderella with no recourse. Given that so 
few people report to have a good relationship with their 
stepparents,120 this scenario could be significantly exacerbated in the 
context of the stepfamily and intestacy. 
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The Legislature has enacted provisions that prevent the 
surviving spouse from completely expending or damaging a thing 
held in usufruct without recourse. Civil Code article 571 obligates 
the usufructuary to give security to the naked owner in order to 
ensure that the usufructuary abides by the prudent administrator 
standard.121 Security also protects the children from the possibility 
that the usufructuary will not have sufficient assets to account for 
the value of consumable things disposed of during the usufruct.122 
While the Code dispenses with the requirement of posting security 
in certain family relationships,123 security is owed by a spouse with 
an 890 usufruct when the naked owners are the surviving spouse’s 
stepchildren.124 This is not surprising. Cognizant of the increased 
potential for abuse or waste that is seen in the Cinderella Problem, 
the Legislature required that security be posted to protect the 
children.125 
Unfortunately, this security may be inadequate. First, although 
the Code requires that the security be in the amount of the “total 
value of the property subject to the usufruct,” courts actually retain 
significant discretion in determining an appropriate amount, though 
the emphasis is on maintaining the protection of the naked owner.126 
Specifically, the court “may increase or reduce the amount of the 
security, upon proper showing, but the amount shall not be less than 
the value of the movables subject to the usufruct.”127 Moreover, the 
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 126. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that “[t]he security shall be in the 
amount of the total value of the property subject to the usufruct. The court may 
increase or reduce the amount of the security, on proper showing, but the amount 
shall not be less than the value of the movables subject to the usufruct.” Id. art. 
572. 
 127. Id. 




Code does not specify what type of security is required, which 
allows courts to infer that any type of security is permissible.128 
Confirming this inference, the Legislature enacted a provision 
describing the types of security that are permissible under the 890 
usufruct: 
If security is owed to the naked owner by the usufructuary 
who is the surviving spouse, the court may order the 
execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents as it 
deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien on either 
community or separate property, movable or immovable, as 
security.129 
This addition complicates the security requirement for a surviving 
spouse with the curious reference to “notes” and “other 
documents.”130 The Legislature has not explained what these 
requirements mean, nor have the courts. 
The ambiguities that result from “security” being poorly defined 
may lead to more disagreement between Drizella and Cinderella. For 
example, Drizella may simply sign an unsecured promissory note as 
security, effectively promising to perform an obligation that she is 
already legally bound to perform. Moreover, because “other 
documents” is not defined in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, it could 
be any type of document, and this may allow Drizella to post illusory 
security. Hence, as it stands now, Drizella could abide by this statute 
but substantively circumvent the security requirement, leaving 
Cinderella without recourse. This potential for circumvention 
undermines the policy behind the security requirement, which is to 
hold Drizella accountable for her use and enjoyment when the naked 
owners are not her children, subverting the sought-after balancing of 
interests between Drizella and Cinderella. 
e. Expenses 
One final source of confusion and potential discord is the 
Code’s requirement that the usufructuary pay various expenses of 
the usufruct.131 The Code distinguishes between ordinary repairs 
and extraordinary repairs, explaining that “[e]xtraordinary repairs 
are those for the reconstruction of the whole or of a substantial part 
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of the property subject to the usufruct. All others are ordinary 
repairs.”132 The distinction between what is considered 
extraordinary and what is considered ordinary, however, is not so 
simply drawn in real life.133 The lack of clarity as to which 
expenses the usufructuary and naked owner are obligated to pay 
adds another level of uncertainty and discord in the context of the 
stepfamily and intestacy. For example, without a clear definition of 
what constitutes an “ordinary expense,” Drizella may refuse to pay 
any expenses, arguing that all expenses of the property are 
“extraordinary” and thus Cinderella’s responsibility. The only 
mechanism that might end the bickering would be litigation, which 
is expensive and requires a delay in the determination of certain 
expenses, potentially allowing for the property to fall into 
significant disrepair.134 
2. The Inadequacies of the 890 Usufruct vis-à-vis the Theories of 
Succession 
Given that the current intestacy scheme is inadequate in the 
context of the stepfamily, a new, modernized approach to the 
blended family in intestacy must be taken. However, to ameliorate 
the present scheme, one must return to the beginning and reconsider 
the theories underlying intestacy. 
a. The Shortfalls of the 890 Usufruct Under the Natural Duty 
Theory 
The 890 usufruct is incompatible with the decedent’s natural 
duty to both his or her children and the natural duty to his or her 
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spouse.135 Louisiana must reevaluate the current 890 usufruct 
scheme if the natural duty theory is a genuine goal of intestate 
succession in Louisiana. 
i. The Natural Duty to the Decedent’s Children 
If the decedent’s natural duty is toward his or her children, the 
890 usufruct only has the potential to conflict with the interests of 
the children. While the decedent’s children would be granted the 
interest of disposition, and thus would be able to sell the property, it 
would be difficult to sell a property burdened with a usufruct.136 In 
the case where a decedent is survived by a much younger spouse 
who is closer in age to his or her children, the surviving spouse 
could outlive the children, thus depriving them of various rights in 
their parent’s community property.137 
ii. The Natural Duty to the Surviving Spouse 
The 890 usufruct in the context of the stepfamily also does not 
comport with the decedent’s natural duty toward his or her surviving 
spouse. Given that an elderly surviving spouse is normally not 
economically self-sufficient,138 the usufruct does not ensure 
Drizella’s economic stability because she is only able to sell her 
rights under the usufruct, which are not as valuable as full 
ownership.139 Additionally, ordinary expenses over a large piece of 
property could be cost-prohibitive, and if Drizella has nothing other 
than a usufruct over a home and even a small amount of cash, she 
cannot be expected to tend to her duties as usufructuary and survive 
day-to-day. 
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b. The Shortfalls of the Presumed Will Theory 
If the presumed will theory is a viable goal in Louisiana 
succession law, then the 890 usufruct fails the stepfamily in this 
regard as well.140 No parent desires complex stepfamily dynamics to 
be under even more strain after his or her death. Also, the evolution 
that took place in the spousal usufruct over the centuries shows that 
spouses want their surviving spouses to be well taken care of.141 
Although the Louisiana Legislature took steps toward improving the 
position of the surviving spouse in intestacy, more should be done to 
protect the interests of both Drizella and Cinderella. Louisiana’s 
current intestacy scheme for the stepfamily is clearly broken, and its 
remedy requires us to look elsewhere for inspiration. 
III. OTHER APPROACHES TO THE CINDERELLA PROBLEM 
Parts I and II of this Comment explored the theories underlying 
succession law and the phenomenon of the blended family and 
subsequently illustrated the deficiencies of Louisiana law in the face 
of these two concepts. Given the shortfalls of Louisiana’s approach 
to the Cinderella Problem, it is necessary to look to other 
jurisdictions for guidance. With increased divorce rates around the 
world,142 the complications stemming from the blended family in 
intestacy exist everywhere.143 Similarly, the improvement in the 
position of the surviving spouse in intestacy was not just limited to 
Louisiana, and varying approaches to the Cinderella Problem 
exist.144 With some more successful at ensuring the balancing of 
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interests between the stepparent and children than others, a 
discussion of several approaches and their respective merits is 
helpful in assembling Louisiana’s solution for Drizella and 
Cinderella. 
A. The Civilian Approach: What Has France Done? 
Considering intestacy to be the fundamental method of 
inheritance, the redactors of the French Civil Code placed great 
importance on intestacy provisions and considered “testamentary 
inheritance somewhat of a gloss” on intestate inheritance.145 French 
academics note that intestate succession is itself testamentary in spirit, 
following the decedent’s presumed will whenever possible.146 
Historically, the “conjoint survivant,” or the surviving spouse, 
was not at the top of the list when it came to inheritance.147 Placing 
the rights of the surviving spouse barely before the rights of the 
State,148 the Code Napoléon originally positioned the surviving 
spouse behind all other relatives capable of inheriting.149 With the 
rationale that the surviving spouse was not a blood relative of the 
deceased, the French Civil Code continued the deeply rooted 
historical objective of keeping a decedent’s patrimony within his or 
her bloodline to ensure the growth and development of the estate.150 
The distribution therefore favored the distribution of the estate to 
those with interests resulting from “lignage” rather than those 
resulting from “marriage.”151 
The low position of the surviving spouse in the context of 
intestate succession was considered by academics as insufficient.152 
Until a recent revision of the intestacy provisions, the surviving 
spouse was considered the “parent pauvre,” or the “poor parent,” as a 
result of the surviving spouse’s unfavorable position.153 Nevertheless, 
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similar to Louisiana, the surviving spouse’s position in France 
improved when 19th century lawmakers gave surviving spouses the 
right to receive a usufruct over one-third of the decedent’s property 
when he or she died intestate.154  
Though the surviving spouse’s position progressively improved 
over the 20th century, the improvement was not enough.155 With the 
increase in diversity of family composition, namely the stepfamily, 
the French intestacy legislation became out of sync with the construct 
of French families.156 Also, the undesirable position of the surviving 
spouse was exacerbated by the French population’s increasing life 
expectancy.157 On the need for repositioning the surviving spouse in 
response to these sociological and economic changes, one French 
politician declared: 
The surviving spouse is no longer considered a stranger that 
the family must defend against, but rather a co-founder of the 
family. The marriage is no longer considered as an institution 
with the goal of continuing on the family wealth, but rather as 
the consecration of two wills for emotional reasons rather than 
economic.158 
These sociological and economic evolutions contributed to the 
need to recalibrate the relationship between the surviving spouse and 
the decedent’s children in the context of intestacy.159 In 2001, the 
French Legislature responded to the sociological and economic 
changes and elevated the surviving spouse’s position by enacting 
French Civil Code article 757. The article provides: 
Where a predeceased spouse leaves children or descendants, 
the surviving spouse shall take, at his or her option, either the 
usufruct of the whole of the existing property or the 
ownership of the quarter where all the children are born from 
both spouses and the ownership of the quarter in the presence 
of one or several children who are not born from both 
spouses.160 
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The provision directly addresses the Cinderella Problem. It 
provides that if the decedent’s children are not also the surviving 
spouse’s children, then the spouse does not have the option to take 
the usufruct but instead must take one-fourth ownership of the 
decedent’s property. Thus, there is no opportunity for the surviving 
spouse to hold a usufruct with the decedent’s children as naked 
owners.161 Giving the surviving spouse no option other than one-
fourth ownership, the French Legislature reasoned that this rule is to 
prevent a surviving spouse from “paralyzing” the interests of the 
parties.162 
Given the comparable societal changes in Louisiana, Professor 
Kathryn V. Lorio has advocated that Louisiana should look to its 
“precursor,” France, for help in fashioning a response to the 
changing societal values regarding stepfamilies.163 Though not 
recommending that Louisiana follow France “blindly,” Professor 
Lorio suggests that adopting a similar scheme may be 
appropriate.164 
Adopting the one-fourth fractional approach taken by the 
French, rather than the usufruct, however, would not best comport 
with either the natural duty or presumed will theories—both of 
which should inform legislation affecting intestate succession.165 
First, the French fractional approach does not align with the 
presumed will of the American decedent because most modern 
studies and surveys show that Americans would like their estates to 
completely devolve to their surviving spouses, even when children 
also survive them.166 Adopting the French approach would reverse 
Louisiana’s trend of honoring the presumed will of the decedent, 
evidenced by its expansion of the spousal usufruct over the 
centuries.167 Further, the fractional approach does not best comport 
with the natural duty theory because the provision does not 
adequately provide for the decedent’s natural duty to ensure his or 
her surviving spouse’s economic welfare in the case of a small 
estate.168 
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B. The United States 
With most people dying intestate, there is no area of American 
private law that concerns the public interest more than intestate 
succession.169 Each state approaches the problem of intestacy 
differently. Significantly, several states have done away with 
common law schemes that grant the surviving spouse a mere 
interest in the decedent’s estate, which are analogous to the 
usufruct and known as “dower.”170 In its place, these states have 
implemented provisions modeled after the Uniform Probate 
Code.171 
1. The Original Uniform Probate Code 
The Original Uniform Probate Code (Original UPC) was 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (the Commission) in the 1960s.172 Today, 15 
states have implemented the Original UPC or portions of it.173 The 
Commission drafted statutes that comported with the presumed will 
theory.174 The drafters wanted a code that would “provide suitable 
rules and procedures for the person of modest means who relies on 
the estate plan provided by law.”175 Under the Original UPC, when a 
decedent died intestate leaving “surviving [children] one or more of 
whom are not [children] of the surviving spouse,” then the surviving 
spouse was entitled to one-half of the intestate estate.176 This 
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fractional distribution between the spouse and the decedent’s 
children was known as the “straight-fractional-share approach.”177 
Academics have argued that despite the Commission’s efforts, 
this uniform law has in actuality failed to comport with the 
presumed will theory.178 Indeed, Professor Lawrence Waggoner, 
Director of Research and Chief Reporter for the UPC, conceded that 
the Original UPC’s straight-fractional-share approach was flawed.179 
Its primary deficiency was that it sacrificed “the surviving spouse’s 
economic security in the smaller to modest estates in order to 
preserve inheritance expectations of adult children who, unlike the 
surviving spouse, are in the labor market and not forced to rely for 
subsistence on capital-generated income.”180 For example, if the 
decedent’s estate totaled $50,000, then the surviving spouse would 
only inherit $25,000 under the straight-fractional-share approach, 
which may be an insufficient amount to ensure his or her continued 
economic stability. 
2. The Revised Uniform Probate Code 
Promulgated in 1990, the Revised Uniform Probate Code 
(Revised UPC) attempted to ameliorate the problems resulting from 
the Original UPC and reform the Original UPC in light of data 
showing the high numbers of people dying intestate.181 In addition, 
the Commission also considered the multi-marriage phenomenon in 
American society in which many American families have both 
biological children and stepchildren.182 Incorporating these facts and 
circumstances, the Revised UPC reflects an effort to achieve 
fairness in the distribution of assets when a decedent dies 
intestate.183 
By enacting what is known as a “lump-sum-plus-a-fraction 
approach,” the Commission was able to account for societal changes 
and further underlying theories and goals. In addressing the 
Cinderella Problem, section 2-102(4) of the Revised UPC provides 
that the surviving spouse will receive “[t]he first $100,000, plus one-
half of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the 
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decedent’s surviving descendants are not [children] of the surviving 
spouse.”184 
This lump-sum-plus-a-fractional approach better serves the 
stepfamily dilemma of balancing the interests of the surviving 
spouse and the stepchildren.185 Academics argue that the fractional 
pattern of distribution only provides the surviving spouse with 
“enough capital to generate an adequate stream of income” when the 
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estate contains significant assets.186 For example, under the original 
UPC, in an intestate estate totaling $30,000, a fractional one-half 
share allots the surviving spouse only $15,000.187 By comparison, 
under the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach, the surviving spouse 
would receive the full amount of the estate.188 
This approach corresponds with the wealth of the estate in the 
blended family make-up.189 In the quintessential estate—one of 
modest value—this approach would strengthen the position of the 
surviving spouse by giving the surviving spouse all of the assets.190 
Academics opine that in small estates, it is more important to ensure 
the economic security of the surviving spouse than it is to “satisfy[] 
the inheritance expectations of the decedent’s adult children.”191 
This conclusion reflects a careful balancing of interests under the 
natural duty approach. This provision would also work in larger 
estates because a decedent would likely feel that giving some of his 
or her estate to his or her children would not drastically affect or 
reduce the surviving spouse’s economic security.192 Thus, the lump-
sum-plus-a-fraction approach better comports with the presumed 
will theory, ensuring the economic stability and comfort of Drizella 
as best the decedent’s estate can.  
3. The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in the United 
States 
Both the Original UPC and Revised UPC have had a major 
influence on the intestacy policies adopted by states.193 Prior to the 
adoption of some version of the UPC, many states included the 
concept of dower in their intestacy provisions.194 “Dower” is an 
ancient common law concept dating back to the Middle Ages with 
principles paralleling that of a usufruct.195 Defined as “a life estate in 
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one-third of all lands in which her deceased husband was seized of an 
estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage,” 196 dower began 
as a wedding gift and ultimately ripened into a right.197 The principles 
embodied in dower are similar to those of a usufruct in two 
fundamental ways: (1) both schemes grant the surviving spouse an 
interest rather than full, outright ownership and (2) this interest 
terminates upon the death of the wife or, in the case of the usufruct, 
upon the death of the usufructuary.198 
In the United States, dower was once very common in most 
states’ intestacy provisions;199 however, in the modern era it has been 
abolished in nearly all states.200 The abolition of dower demonstrates 
an effort to move toward more modern regimes201 that give the 
surviving spouse an outright ownership interest in the estate.202 
Among the states that have abolished dower and implemented the 
Revised UPC are Alaska,203 Colorado,204 Michigan,205 Montana,206 
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STAT. ANN. § 13.06.005 (Westlaw 2014). 
 204. Colorado has abolished dower, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-112 
(Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC, see id. § 15-11-102.  
 205. Michigan has abolished dower in community property, see MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 557.214 (Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC, 
see id. § 700.2102. 
 206. Montana has abolished dower, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-122 
(Westlaw 2014), and adopted the Revised UPC, see id. § 72-2-112. 




and North Dakota.207 Some states have abolished dower and 
implemented the Original UPC,208 and several other states have 
abolished dower and implemented provisions roughly based on the 
Original UPC.209 This retreat from dower can be attributed to the 
complications that it brings. These complications include: the 
inalienability of the property that is burdened with this right and the 
practical ineffectiveness of the regime when the deceased owns little 
or no property210—the same problems experienced by usufructuaries 
and naked owners in Louisiana.211 
Ultimately, the concept of splitting ownership between members 
of a stepfamily under article 890 should be abolished. Instead, the 
surviving spouse should get a certain portion of the estate in full 
ownership. Full ownership would ensure the surviving spouse is 
better provided for because the surviving spouse has a full ownership 
interest, rather than sharing partial ownership with the stepchildren. 
The abolition of dower in the United States in favor of a full 
ownership interest demonstrates the evolution of the surviving 
spouse’s position in the context of intestacy, and it is a model that 
should be followed in Louisiana by transforming the usufruct interest 
into a full ownership interest. The natural duty theory in favor of the 
surviving spouse is carried out with this granting of full ownership 
because the surviving spouse is able to sell or do as he or she wants 
with the given property. The goals behind the presumed will theory 
are furthered because the decedent usually desires the entire estate to 
devolve to the surviving spouse upon death. Thus following with the 
trend of other states, Louisiana should provide a full ownership 
interest to Drizella. 
IV. SOLUTION: ADOPTING THE LUMP-SUM-PLUS-A-FRACTION 
APPROACH 
The evolution of the spousal usufruct in Louisiana was a result 
of the heightened value that Louisiana began to place on ensuring 
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NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-104 (Westlaw 2014), and New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 560:3 (Westlaw 2014). 
 209. Some of these states include Alabama, ALA. CODE § 43-8-57 (Westlaw 
2014), Florida, FLA. STAT. § 732.111 (Westlaw 2014), Maryland, MD. CODE 
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS, § 3-202 (Westlaw 2014), and Missouri, MO. REV. STAT.     
§ 474.110 (Westlaw 2014). 
 210. GLENDON, supra note 33, at 283. 
 211. See generally discussion supra Part II.B. 




the economic security of the surviving spouse upon the death of the 
spouse.212 Over time, this spousal usufruct was extended to 
stepparents, demonstrating again the increased value placed on the 
surviving spouse.213 These legislative changes demonstrate a 
material shift in the way that Louisiana views intestate succession, 
culminating in an emphasis on maintenance of the surviving 
spouse.214 In response to these societal changes, Louisiana must 
further improve the provisions governing the blended family in 
intestate succession. The optimal approach would be for Louisiana 
to follow the model of the Revised UPC’s lump-sum-plus-a-fraction 
approach and give the surviving spouse the right to receive the first 
$100,000 of the estate plus one-half of the remaining share of the 
estate.215 
Thus, for example, assume Cinderella’s father and Drizella had 
accumulated $500,000 during their marriage. When her husband 
dies, Drizella would receive the first $100,000 plus half of the 
remaining community property: $200,000. Accordingly, Cinderella 
would receive the remaining $200,000 of the estate plus all of her 
father’s separate property.216 This approach better comports with 
both the natural duty and presumed will theories. First, this solution 
comports with the natural duty theory because the surviving spouse 
is better provided for than with the current 890 usufruct. Receiving 
outright ownership, the surviving spouse is not required to share 
interests in property with the decedent’s children. The potential for 
any discord associated with this sharing—payment of expenses and 
maintenance—is thus eliminated. Secondly, the presumed will 
theory is furthered because the surviving spouse receives portions of 
the decedent’s property in full ownership, rather than a mere 
interest. Further, given that most decedents want their surviving 
spouses to receive their property upon their death, the presumed will 
                                                                                                             
 212. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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 214. See generally discussion supra Part I.A. At the same time, the forced 
heirship doctrine was greatly reduced. Today, forced heirship is only applicable to 
children 23 years and under and incapable adults. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2014). 
For more on the history of forced heirship in Louisiana, see generally LORIO, 
supra note 23, § 10:1–10.3, at 295–314. 
 215. Of course, if the decedent were to die survived by forced heirs in addition 
to the surviving spouse, the right of the forced heirs to the legitime would take 
precedence over the inheritance rights of the surviving spouse. In such a case, the 
share of the surviving spouse would be reduced to the extent necessary to satisfy 
the forced portion of the estate. This solution does not advocate overriding the 
principles of forced heirship. In the rare event forced heirs are present, their rights 
would take priority over those of the surviving spouse. 
 216. Under Louisiana law, upon a decedent’s intestate death, his or her 
children receive all of the decedent’s separate property. See LORIO, supra note 23. 




theory is also better served under this example than under the 
current intestacy scheme.217 
Though granting full ownership rather than a mere interest in the 
decedent’s community property is a significant change from the 
current approach, states across the country have taken this route over 
the last few decades by abolishing dower in favor of full ownership, 
thus proving that it would not be difficult for Louisiana to adopt a 
similar system. Louisiana should not be reluctant to adopt a non-
civilian scheme given that France successfully adopted an approach 
advocating for full ownership rather than a usufruct.218 Following in 
the footsteps of other states that have abolished dower in favor of a 
full ownership interest and also following in the footsteps of France, 
Louisiana should eliminate the usufruct interest and instead replace 
it with a full ownership interest in the first $100,000 and one-half of 
the remaining community property. In light of the evolution of the 
family that has taken place over the centuries, Louisiana should 
adopt the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach so the stepmother can 
live happily ever after too. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the modern prevalence of remarriage and the high rate of 
people dying without wills, Louisiana must do more for Drizella and 
Cinderella in intestacy than the 890 usufruct currently allows. 
Increasing the opportunity for conflict and the likelihood of 
litigation, the 890 usufruct is inherently unworkable in the context of 
the stepfamily and intestacy. Looking to France and other states, 
Louisiana has an opportunity to learn from the approaches of other 
jurisdictions. Allowing for full ownership over a portion, rather than 
a mere interest in the decedent’s share of the community property, 
the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach would decrease the 
problems currently faced by stepfamilies in intestacy. Implementing 
this approach in Louisiana would ensure that Cinderella and Drizella 
can both live happily ever after. 
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